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Abstract: This paper examines explanations for human artistic behavior in two reductionist 
research programs, cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Despite their 
different methodological outlooks, both approaches converge on an explanation of art 
production and appreciation as byproducts of normal perceptual and motivational cognitive 
skills that evolved in response to problems originally not related to art, such as the 
discrimination of salient visual stimuli and speech sounds. The explanatory power of this 
reductionist framework does not obviate the need for higher-level accounts of art from the 
humanities, such as aesthetics, art history or anthropology of art.  
Keywords: cognitive neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, art 
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯  
Introduction 
In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists and evolutionary psychologists have 
provided reductionist accounts of human behavior in terms of the lower-level theories and 
concepts of biology. Reductionism in scientific practice is primarily an explanatory 
strategy: Reductionist scientific explanations are not necessarily committed to the view that 
higher levels of explanation can always be reduced to more fundamental ones; rather, they 
attempt to gain a better understanding of a given phenomenon by focusing on a basic level 
of explanation. Unification, the ability to explain a wide range of phenomena using a 
relatively restricted set of premises, is arguably the most important of the explanatory goals 
of reductionist research programs (Steel, 2004). Evaluations of these programs should 
therefore assess to what extent they are successful in unifying a diversity of observations 
through a restricted set of principles. This paper examines to what extent two flourishing 
reductionist approaches to human behavior – cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary 
psychology – provide unifying explanatory frameworks to understand art and its aesthetic 
appreciation, and whether they obviate the need for higher-level accounts. Additionally, it 
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explores to what extent theoretical evolutionary considerations can outline new directions 
for empirical research on art production and appreciation.  
Art presents an ideal case study to evaluate reductionist programs, because it is a 
paradigmatic domain of investigation of the humanities, such as aesthetics, art history and 
art sociology which typically take a more holistic approach to the phenomena under 
investigation. Within and across these disciplines, there is little agreement on how art 
should be studied or defined. Although visual art (in the form of body decoration, artifact 
decoration, and often sculpture and painting), dance and music appear in all known human 
cultures past and present (Brown, 1991, p. 140), most indigenous languages lack a term 
equivalent to the western notion of art for art’s sake, which only emerged in the late 18th 
century (Dutton, 2009). A radical solution to this definitional problem is to qualify only 
fine art, as it developed in post-Enlightenment Europe. But this merely shifts the problem 
of continuity: The functions, styles and social contexts of 19th-century art clearly differ 
from that of, say, the 1950s, which again radically differs from that of art today. On the 
other hand, Hellenistic sculptors, Gothic architects, and Melanesian wood carvers did not 
possess the modern western concept of art, yet we readily appreciate and appropriate their 
work. And just as sculptures from sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania adorn western homes, 
artists from these cultures have eagerly adopted western styles and media, as for example in 
historical ledger art (narrative drawings in pencil in ledger books by Native Americans of 
the Great Plains) or contemporary Australian aboriginal painting, which mixes indigenous 
themes with western media such as oil or acryl painting. Thus, even though people from 
those cultures do not have terms that are equivalent to our notion of art, they seem to 
recognize similarities between their and our artistic expressions. Moreover, many cultures 
have indigenous terms that capture aspects of the western concept of art, such as skill or 
beauty (Van Damme, 1997). Experimental studies (e.g., Seifert, 1992) show that western 
subjects without any formal training in art or aesthetics display and freely express aesthetic 
judgments on works of visual art, even if they are unfamiliar with them, like African 
sculpture. What is it that we intuit when we judge something to be a work of art?  
Providing a concept of art that would allow us to discriminate art from non-art is an 
outstanding problem in contemporary philosophy of art – attempting a solution to this 
problem falls outside the scope of this paper. Also, this paper will not try to establish what 
factors contribute to artistic quality (i.e., what distinguishes “good art” from “bad art”). We 
do seem to have an intuitive, pretheoretical notion of what art may be (Osborne, 1981). 
Humans may possess a folk concept of art akin to folk biology and folk psychology: a tacit, 
inarticulate concept of what a work of art is like, which guides their identification of some 
objects and performances across cultures as art. This folk concept includes objects and 
performances that are typically manmade, that elicit aesthetic experiences1, and that are 
embedded in social contexts. It is this broad folk concept of art that scholars across 
disciplines attempt to capture. Some (e.g., Davies, 2006) emphasize the aesthetic properties 
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of artworks, attempting to discriminate from other phenomenological experiences an 
aesthetic sensation, i.e., a subjective sensation of pleasure derived from sensory (usually 
visual or auditory) perception. Others, following Gell (1998), deliberately exclude 
aesthetics from their analysis and focus on the social role of art. Next to these, some 
philosophers of art (e.g., Levinson, 1993) prefer to examine artworks in terms of the 
intentions of their makers. None of these attempts have provided an adequate concept of art 
that captures all forms of human production that we intuit as art. For this reason, some 
philosophers of art (e.g., Mag Uidhir and Magnus, in press) propose to abandon the search 
for a unifying concept of art. In the light of this methodological and conceptual 
fragmentation, reductionist approaches with their promise of a unified explanation seem 
highly desirable.  
Whereas traditional philosophy of art takes artworks as a starting point, recent 
naturalistic approaches (e.g., Carroll, 2004) concentrate on the human cognitive faculties 
and behaviors that are responsible for the creation and enjoyment of these objects. After all, 
there is no experience of art except through our cognitive and perceptual systems. Thus, to 
understand why people create and enjoy art, it is important to understand its neurological 
underpinnings. Its universality across cultures also seems to warrant an explanation in 
biological terms. It is therefore not surprising that the first attempts to provide a unified 
explanation for art in biological terms date back to the 19th century. Experimental aesthetics 
(see Aiken, 1998, for an overview) was in fact among the earliest domains of experimental 
psychological investigation, with founders of the field like Wundt and Fechner probing 
their subjects’ aesthetic responses to the golden ratio2. Later, Behaviorism was reflected in 
the experimental study of aesthetics. For example, Berlyne (1974) investigated the 
psychological basis of aesthetics as arising from the fundamental needs for arousal and 
excitement that are closely related to a drive for exploration and curiosity. Martindale’s 
experimental analysis of patterns of stylistic change in European music (e.g., Martindale 
and Uemura, 1983) suggested that rapid stylistic changes do not stem from a universal 
drive to innovate, but rather from the human desire to avoid repetition and boredom. 
Martindale held the well-understood mechanism of habituation responsible for the craving 
for novelty in art in modern European and American culture.  
Theoretical and conceptual developments in psychology, in particular the decline of 
Behaviorism and the growing influence of evolutionary theory in studies of human 
behavior are reflected in current scientific investigations of art. Evolutionary theory offers 
the possibility of a unified approach to human artistic behavior. Tinbergen’s four questions 
(1963) form a useful starting point. Tinbergen (1963) proposed that any evolved trait or 
behavior can be explained through four complementary explanatory strategies: its 
proximate causal mechanisms (what physical structures, such as hormones or brain 
structures, are causally responsible for the trait), its ultimate function (how does the trait 
contribute to an organism’s fitness, why did it evolve), its development (how does the trait 
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arise in individual ontogeny) and its phylogeny (its evolutionary history). This paper will 
focus on two of these questions: proximate and ultimate causes3. As we shall see, cognitive 
neuroscience primarily investigates proximate causal mechanisms (brain structures) 
responsible for artistic behavior, whereas evolutionary psychology mainly concentrates on 
ultimate causes (e.g., what are the consequences of artistic behavior for an individual’s 
fitness). We will argue that the byproduct account of art, which conceptualizes artistic 
behavior as a byproduct of normal cognitive processes, rather than as an adaptation, is most 
successful in integrating these approaches. Given the current methodological and 
conceptual fragmentation in the field of art studies, such an integrative approach would be 
welcome.  
Cognitive Neuroscience and Art 
Cognitive neuroscience is a successful reductionist research program that provides 
causal accounts for cognitive states by reference to brain states. Subdisciplines like neuro-
economics, neuro-ethics, or neuro-aesthetics attempt to provide neurally grounded 
explanations for phenomena typically investigated by the humanities, such as economic 
decision-making, moral judgments or aesthetic appreciation. By looking at patterns of brain 
activation (neuroimaging studies) and cognitive impairments following brain damage 
(lesion studies), it examines how the functional architecture of the brain produces cognitive 
processes. In this way, cognitive neuroscience seems well suited to address the proximate 
causal mechanisms that are involved in artistic behavior, in particular the brain structures 
that are responsible for art production and appreciation.  
Since the brain is the only organ responsible for cognition, every cognitive task 
must yield a specific pattern of brain activation. Why then is it interesting to localize 
cognitive functions if all are localizable? If we put people who contemplate the Mona Lisa 
under a scanner, this will activate neural circuits dealing with face-recognition, emotion 
and perhaps theory of mind (our intuitive psychology that allows us to infer mental states, 
such as the reason why she might smile). It does not follow that the brain contains a “Mona 
Lisa module,” even if these patterns of activation are stable across subjects. To constrain 
their research, neuroscientists look for psychological primitives, capacities that are not 
further reducible to other, more basic abilities. Due to these methodological constraints, 
they typically propose cognitive specializations at a relatively fine grain (Bechtel and 
Mundale, 1999). However, psychological primitives do not necessarily equate with single 
brain regions – rather, what is important is that the same areas are robustly activated across 
a wide variety of tasks (De Smedt, 2009). Theory of mind, for instance, activates a 
distributed network of neural circuits, including the medial prefrontal cortex, superior 
temporal sulcus, and temporal poles (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). What makes it a 
psychological primitive is that the same network is activated across a wide diversity of 
tasks that involve the attribution of mental states to others, such as beliefs and desires, 
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including interpreting cartoons and stories, or even watching simple geometric shapes 
“chasing” each other (Gallagher and Frith, 2003).  
Does art constitute a psychological primitive? Neuroimaging studies of subjects 
looking at visual art indicate that propensities and biases of the visual system can account 
for many recurring features of art. Indeed, several authors (e.g., Latto, 1995) have argued 
that works of art capture our attention precisely because the artists that created them have 
unconsciously homed in on propensities of the human nervous system. For example, the 
search of artists like Mondriaan and Malevich for pure forms accords with the presence of 
orientation-selective cells in the primary visual cortex (V1) that respond selectively to dots 
and straight lines, especially to horizontal and vertical ones (Zeki, 1998). This is part of the 
earliest stages of processing by our visual system. Mondriaan’s Trafalgar square (ca. 1943) 
is a typical example of visual art that stirs the orientation-selective neurons in V1. Since the 
Late Pleistocene, combinations of straight lines are commonly found, for instance in the 
engraved ochre plaquettes from Blombos cave, South Africa (about 75,000 years old), as 
are dots on Franco-Cantabrian cave walls (e.g., the spotted horses from Pech Merle, France, 
16,000 years old). Such designs are also observed on artifacts from diverse periods (e.g., 
decorative lines and dots on earthenware from the Linear Pottery culture from the European 
Neolithic, 5500-4500 BC) and in the artistic production of many nonwestern cultures (e.g., 
geometric patterns on basketry or cloth). The pervasiveness of geometric designs across 
widely divergent cultures and periods may be explained by the fact that they are appealing 
to the early human visual system (Hodgson, 2006). Although the popularity of geometric 
designs could also be due to the fact that they are simple to render, and that they can be 
used as building blocks of more complex designs, as in Yuan and Ming dynasty Chinese 
painting, where bamboo is rendered with a few simple brush strokes, the fact that they are 
consistently used alongside more complex designs (e.g., dot and stripe patterns alongside 
animals depicted in Paleolithic imagery) provides evidence for their intrinsic appeal.  
Some forms of art key in on trichromatic color processing, a visual system humans 
have in common with most diurnal primates. Color-sensitive cells in the visual areas V1 
and V2 are mainly concerned with registering the intensity and presence of color fields. 
Artists like Rothko or Klein produced paintings with large iridescent color fields that key in 
on this stage of color processing (Zeki, 1999, p. 189). By contrast, fauvist and expressionist 
canvases evoke responses in V4 and in the inferior temporal and frontal cortices (Zeki and 
Marini, 1998), which are involved in matching colors to objects. People process images 
with correct colors in a different way from images that have colors that are not commonly 
associated with the objects they depict, such as blue strawberries. The latter elicit a strong 
activation of the dorsolateral frontal cortex (Zeki and Marini, 1998). The unusual neural 
pathways associated with our perception of mismatching colors may provide an 
explanation for why such images are attention grabbing. Fauvist and expressionist painters 
unknowingly hit upon this when they began to paint objects in mismatching colors, like 
Matisse’s portraits of his wife, with green and blue patches across her face, or the blue 
horses by Marc.  
Yet other forms of art are experimentally associated with an increased activation in 
the motion-sensitive visual areas, such as the medial temporal and medial superior temporal 
cortices (Zeki, 1998). This is not only the case for dance, but also for contemporary art 
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forms like mobiles by Tinguely and Calder. A Positron Emission Tomography study 
(Brown, Martinez, and Parsons, 2006) of subjects who tango revealed that dance involves a 
network of neural circuits normally engaged in ordinary bipedal locomotion and in the 
organization of complex sequences of movements. Somewhat surprisingly, the activation of 
the medial temporal and superior temporal cortex is also observed in subjects who look at 
classical and renaissance sculptures in contrapposto stance4 (Di Dio, Macaluso, and 
Rizzolatti, 2007). Apparently, brain areas that visually analyze motion are not just active 
when seeing actual motion, but also when it is implied.  
Music, too, recruits brain mechanisms that are associated with a variety of normal, 
everyday cognitive activities. Listening to music recruits Broca’s area and the orbitalis 
region of the left inferior frontal cortex, neural regions specialized in the processing of 
grammatical structure (Levitin and Menon, 2003). Music that violates expectations in 
rhythms or harmonic structures activates brain areas that were previously implicated in 
violations of syntax in language (Maess, Koelsch, Gunter, and Friederici, 2001). At the 
same time, experimental evidence (e.g., Huron, 2004) indicates that people who listen to 
music have a clear preference for expected over unexpected sounds, and find the former 
more pleasant. Many musical devices, such as the appoggiatura (an embellishment along 
the main note) or harmonic cadences (the use of at least two chords to conclude a section or 
phrase of music) promote prediction by the listener (Huron, 2004). Classical period 
compositions, for instance by Haydn or Mozart, often balance on a cognitive optimum 
between predictability and violation of expectation: They are predictable enough to evoke 
pleasurable responses, but occasionally violate these predictions so that the audience 
remains interested and focused, for example by inserting changes in modulation and 
rhythm, introducing elements from folk music, or by incorporating unusual instruments 
(e.g., Leopold Mozart’s Cassation in G for toys, two oboes, two horns, strings and 
continuo, that introduces toy instruments into an otherwise normal orchestral piece). 
Because neuroimaging studies rely on stimuli of limited duration, at present no such studies 
have probed what neural mechanisms underlie the perception and appreciation of literature. 
It seems, however, that short stories and jokes invoke neural circuits involved with theory 
of mind (Gallagher and Frith, 2003) – presumably, the same would be true for someone 
reading Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (1878[1995]).  
An interesting pattern emerges from these studies on different types of art: In all 
cases, the aesthetic responses are elicited by tapping into the normal functions of perceptual 
systems in unconventional ways. Why should the perception of blue horses, which yields 
an enhanced response in the inferior temporal cortex, or of atypical musical structures, 
leading to an increased activity in Broca’s area, elicit aesthetic responses? Given the 
limited attentional resources of the brain, perceptual inputs compete for neural space. It 
thus seems likely that because of their importance to the survival and reproduction of an 
organism, some cues are given priority by the early perceptual systems – for example, as 
we shall see further on, the human auditory system is especially well attuned to the acoustic 
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properties of the human voice, and the human visual system is apt at recognizing face-like 
stimuli. The brain could be regarded as a set of world-interpreting mechanisms that lead us 
to ignore some aspects of the world, while others are accorded disproportionate attention. 
Aesthetic responses may find their origin in the brain’s reward system, which guides 
attention to relevant perceptual input (Barry, 2006). Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) 
propose that successful art exploits these tendencies, thereby eliciting strong emotional 
responses. Some cognitive neuroscientific studies provide support for these views. Looking 
at paintings one deems beautiful activates reward-based emotional circuits compared to 
duller paintings (Vartanian and Goel, 2004). Similarly, participants looking at canonical 
classical and renaissance sculptures show higher activation in the anterior right insula 
compared to a control condition in which the proportions of these sculptures have been 
digitally altered so as to look less harmonious (Di Dio et al., 2007). The anterior right 
insula is a part of the limbic system that is consistently involved in mediating cravings for 
food and so-called recreational drugs and in providing an emotionally relevant context for 
perceptual experience (Garavan, 2010). Likewise, people listening to their favorite music 
show stronger activation in reward and motivation-related brain areas compared to control 
compositions (Blood and Zatorre, 2001).  
This intimate connection between the function of art and the function of the brain 
led Zeki (1999, p. 10) to quip that artists are in a sense neuroscientists, since art, in order to 
be successful, must appeal to human perceptual, conceptual and motivational systems. In 
other words, art appeals to us because it exaggerates or appropriates features that human 
perception is tuned to (e.g., faces, color contrasts) while ignoring or underplaying other 
features that are less important to human perception. For example, many works of visual art 
contain revealing systematic mistakes in rendering perspective, shadows, and reflections 
accurately. Take shadows as an illustration. Painters typically do not depict shadows 
realistically. Outside of western art, most traditions omit shadows altogether (Gombrich, 
1995). When artists do attempt to paint shadows, they often fail to do this consistently: An 
examination of a corpus of western historical paintings (Casati, 2008) revealed that painters 
tended to produce a replica of the visible profile of the caster when depicting shadows, 
which yields impossible shadows (e.g., the correct shadow of a cube would look trapezoid 
or rectangular, but painters instead just make an outline of the cube in grayscale). Most 
observers are not bothered by these inconsistencies in lighting – indeed, without being told 
about them, they do not even notice them (Cavanagh, 2005). In accordance with this, 
developmental psychological studies indicate that an understanding of the behavior of 
shadows only emerges in late childhood. Infants, for example, show no surprise when a 
shadow behaves anomalously with respect to the object by which it is cast (Van De Walle, 
Rubenstein, and Spelke, 1998). Even adults have difficulties predicting what shadows will 
look like given the distance and angle of a light source and the shape of an object 
(Ostrovsky, Cavanagh, and Pawan, 2005). Shadows have been put to dramatic use in film 
noir and expressionist movies such as in Murnau’s 1922 horror movie Nosferatu, eine 
Symphonie des Grauens, yet even there the actual shape of the shadows has been distorted 
beyond what would normally be cast by the actors, something that does not seem to bother 
the audience.  
The intimate fit between artistic production and human cognition can explain why 
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artists are unconsciously drawn to some art forms over others, or when, if a new artistic 
style is developed, it tends to evolve in specific ways. Take the example of abstract art: 
Since the 18th century, artists have attempted to break free of aesthetic conventions in order 
to capture the essence of their subject matter, culminating in abstract art. Yet, as we have 
seen, abstract art often appeals strongly to early perceptual systems, by using vivid colors, 
straight lines or sharp contrasts, exploiting amongst others areas V1, V2 and V4. The 
perceptual tendencies of the human brain can be seen as cognitive attractors that have 
channeled abstract art in preordained directions, in particular, a tendency toward more 
clear-cut, simplified and geometric shapes, brighter colors and higher color contrasts, 
arguably because these features elicit stronger responses in the artist’s and viewer’s early 
perceptual systems. In the work of well-known artists like Klee, Mondriaan and Matisse, 
one can indeed observe an evolution toward the progressive influence of these cognitive 
attractors, in the increasing use of strong lines, vivid colors and bold contrasts. Ironically, 
by striving to escape from artistic conventions, abstract artists were lured into the 
conventions of the human perceptual systems. Or, to put it more positively, as “to abstract” 
means “going back to the essentials,” abstract art has indeed succeeded in stripping away 
cultural conventions by reverting to elementary responses of the human perceptual systems.  
Taken together, neuroimaging studies suggest that art is not a psychological 
primitive. Rather, it hijacks the preferences of normal perceptual and motivational neural 
circuits. Lesion studies provide an equally compelling case: Art production seems to 
continue irrespective of the location or extent of the lesions in the brain of the artist. Not 
even at the very rough level of hemispheric specialization do we see any modularity in 
artistic behavior – the loss of function in either hemisphere does not automatically lead to 
an inability to create art (Zaidel, 2005). In a case study of an Asian-American artist, Mell, 
Howard and Miller (2003) document the gradual shift over 12 years from conventional 
Chinese themes to a bolder, expressionist style throughout her cognitive decline due to 
fronto-temporal dementia (FTD). Remarkably, some patterns of brain damage, resulting 
from FTD, are correlated with an emergence of artistic skills in previously non-artistic 
individuals (e.g., Miller et al., 1998). The five patients (all in their 50s or 60s) described by 
Miller et al. (1998) all spontaneously began to take up art classes, painted, sculpted or 
photographed obsessively without any previous interest in art, and were later diagnosed 
with FTD. Their interest in art is thus not a result of therapy. FTD patients typically have 
impairments in language, executive control and social skills, but remain relatively 
unaffected in the domains of visual perception and motor skills. According to Miller et al. 
(1998), the decline in inhibitory control that is typical for FTD might facilitate the already 
present capacities for visual art production in these subjects. Alternatively, the patients may 
have chosen to focus on visual art because of the difficulties they experienced in other 
domains, such as social interaction, and the relative preservation of their motor and visual 
skills. In either way, this research suggests that the capacity to make art is not restricted to 
the select few, but is present in the population at large. This may also be true for music. A 
study that investigated musical memory (Racette and Peretz, 2007) suggests that 
professional musicians are not significantly better than laypeople in recalling the melody, 
rhythm and lyrics of unfamiliar folk songs, despite their extensive training in and 
familiarity with music. 
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If art is not a psychological primitive but an epiphenomenon, cognitive 
neuroscience cannot study art as such – indeed, what the neuroscience studies seem to tell 
us is that when subjects view a work of art, they do not see, say, a canvas or a statue; rather, 
they react to what it represents (e.g., a seascape, a nude woman). However, cognitive 
neuroscientists who examine artistic behavior (e.g., Vartanian and Goel, 2004; Zeki, 1998) 
do not claim that art does not correspond to anything in the real world. Quite on the 
contrary, many of them (e.g., Cavanagh, 2005) argue that the history of art can inform 
theories of the human mind, because successful art provides a window onto invariant 
properties of the human perceptual systems.  
Art as Adaptation 
Evolutionary psychology aims to explain features of human behavior as a product 
of an interaction between evolved psychological mechanisms and the environment, making 
use of methods from evolutionary biology, such as kin selection or parental investment the-
ory. It does not regard culture as completely autonomous but as at least in part reducible to 
the human evolved cognitive architecture. Evolutionary psychologists disagree about the 
extent to which this reduction of culture to evolved cognitive tendencies is possible. Some 
(e.g., Tooby and Cosmides, 1992) argue that most of culture consists of “evoked” cognitive 
predispositions, while others (e.g., Dunbar and Barrett, 2007) allow for a larger influence of 
culturally transmitted norms and rules in governing human behavior. Nonetheless, much of 
the evolutionary psychological literature is clearly unificationist, as it attempts to “integrate 
the social sciences into a seamless system of interconnected knowledge that runs from 
astronomy to biology” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 19).  
Some evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Barrett and Kurzban, 2006), like the 
majority of cognitive neuroscientists, are also committed to a model of functional 
specialization in human cognition.  In contrast to cognitive neuroscientists, this functional 
specialization is not cast in anatomical terms, but in terms of evolutionary theory: The mind 
contains domain-specific computational devices that deal with problems our ancestors 
recurrently faced. Typically, the cognitive adaptations that evolutionary psychologists 
propose are less fine-grained than the psychological primitives studied by cognitive 
neuroscience, corresponding to real-world adaptive problems like cheater detection or the 
attribution of mental states. The evolutionary rationale for this is that different adaptive 
problems can be solved more efficiently by specialized mental subsystems than by a single 
holistic processor. Even without this commitment to adaptationism, an evolutionary 
approach does seem to favor some form of functional cognitive specialization, because 
many computational problems (e.g., mate selection and foraging) are functionally 
incompatible (the criteria for choosing a mate are different from those for finding food) and 
thus cannot be adequately handled by a single computational device (Cosmides and Tooby, 
1994).  
Although evolutionary psychologists are interested in both proximate and ultimate 
explanations in a variety of domains of human behavior, their examinations of art have so 
far concentrated on ultimate explanations of why people spend considerable time and 
energy in their production and enjoyment of art. Two types of approaches to explaining 
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artistic behavior have been proposed: either that it is an adaptation, which has evolved in 
direct response to one or more selective pressures in our ancestral past, or that it is a 
byproduct of other adaptations that does not serve an adaptive function in itself. Its 
complexity makes it implausible that art would have evolved through random genetic drift. 
Those (e.g., Dissanayake, 2000) who favor the view that art is an adaptation invoke 
its universality across cultures, its costliness in terms of time and energy, and its early and 
spontaneous development in children. We will briefly discuss a selection of recent 
adaptationist models for art. Miller (2000) argues that art and other forms of human 
creative behavior evolved as a result of sexual selection: Their costliness in terms of time 
and energy provided ancestral hominids with an honest signal of the fitness of the art-
producing person (in Miller’s view, primarily the art-producing male). Just like a lush but 
burdensome tail in peacocks or birds of paradise is a good signal of its owner’s qualities to 
live with such a handicap, the artworks honestly signal the artist’s qualities as a mate. In 
support of his hypothesis, Miller (1999) shows that the artistic production of western male 
writers, jazz musicians, and painters peaks during prime reproductive age, with a higher 
productivity in quantitative terms compared to their female peers. The latter have a more 
even distribution of artistic output across their lifespan, and do not experience the sharp 
decline in artistic production during middle age that is typical of their male fellows. A 
potential problem with this evidence is that it is solely based on an analysis of western 
artists. The quantitatively higher male output may be due to socio-cultural factors, such as 
gender-based prejudices in perception of male versus female artistic qualities. A way to 
control for this possible western bias would be to replicate Miller’s study in nonwestern 
cultures, especially in those where women are responsible for a substantial part of the art 
production. For example, in Tonga (a Polynesian kingdom), woven ceremonial mats that 
are exclusively the work of women have high aesthetic and cultural value – a collection of 
such mats constitutes the Tongan crown jewels (St. Cartmail, 1997). These ceremonial 
mats are not primarily functional objects (although they resemble functional, non-decorated 
mats in some respects) and are thus a good analogy to the (primarily non-functional) art 
production in western culture. Tongan men, on the other hand, carve functional wooden 
objects like decorated bowls and neck supports. A cross-cultural test of Miller’s hypothesis 
evaluating art production in cultures where both men and women are active artists (such as 
Tonga, or Navajo native Americans) could examine whether men still have a higher 
quantitative production in these cultures, and whether there is a correlation in men (but not 
in women) between a peak in artistic production and the prime reproductive years. Even if 
this were the case, there is yet another possible confound to Miller’s hypothesis, namely 
more general sexual differences in motivation and drive: Men might be more prone to have 
a high quantitative output of art for the same reason that they seek higher income jobs. 
Indeed, Kanazawa (2000) found that male but not female scientists tend to write the lion’s 
share of their papers in their prime reproductive period. Thus, sexual differences in art 
production could be the result of sexual selection, but this does not entail that sexual 
selection specifically targeted art and other cultural displays.  
Tooby and Cosmides (2001) point out that pretend play emerges universally in 
toddlers. This ability provides us with the imagined worlds of (oral and written) literature 
and visual art, risk-free environments where learning can take place through vicarious 
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experience: Fairy tales like Snow White tell of the competition that may arise between 
fading mothers and nubile daughters, whereas novels like Austen’s Sense and Sensibility 
(1811[1986]) provide an insight into human mate selection dogged by financial worries. 
Although this hypothesis sounds intuitively plausible, it has not been empirically 
investigated. A possible test for Tooby and Cosmides’ (2001) claim might be to investigate 
correlations between early exposure to fiction and performance in theory of mind tasks. 
Some studies (e.g., Taylor and Carlsen, 1997) indicate that children who engage more in 
imaginative play (i.e., creating fictional environments) are advanced in theory of mind 
comprehension compared to their less imaginative peers. Future work may indicate to what 
extent being engaged in fiction (such as children’s books, read aloud by parents) has an 
effect on the developing theory of mind.  
Dissanayake (2000) proposes that art is the intentional act of making everyday 
behavior special through exaggeration, formalization, or manipulation of expectations: 
dance exaggerates and formalizes normal bodily movements; songs distort normal speech 
and prosody. Performing such actions together relieves tension and anxiety, thus improving 
social bonds within the community: Such rituals “build and reinforce feelings of unity 
among adults, all of which ultimately serve to hold the group together” (Dissanayake, 2000, 
p. 64). She traces the evolutionary precursor of these behaviors to mother-infant dyadic 
interactions, where mothers and infants spontaneously engage in intentionally modifying 
their vocalizations, gestures and facial expressions. One potential source of tension in this 
account is that it has conflicting notions on the level at which selection operates. On the 
one hand, Dissanayake seems to favor a group selectionist account of art, as she identifies 
fitness benefits of art at the group level, such as an increased cohesion between group 
members (e.g., Dissanayake, 2000, pp. 64, 168). On the other hand, she has emphasized 
that art is a result of individual selection, since, according to her, “Art is a behavior 
potentially available to everyone because all humans have the disposition to do it” 
(Dissanayake, 1995, pp. 34–35). To Dissanayake, this indicates that art is the result of 
selection at the individual level: “Art-inclined individuals, those who possessed this 
behavior of art, survived better than those who did not. That is to say, a behavior of art had 
‘selective’ or ‘survival’ value” (Dissanayake, 1995, p. 35).  Unfortunately, the claim that 
art improves survival chances has not been experimentally tested. Furthermore, insisting 
that a selectionist account needs to operate at the individual level requires more backing up: 
Cross-cultural research (e.g., Anderson, 1989) indicates that the production of art by adults 
is usually the work of specialists. As Davies (2005, p. 295) pointed out, Dissanayake could 
have opted for a weaker position, where only a few talented persons make art, but where art 
is still a pan-cultural phenomenon. As long as a sufficient number of individuals make art, 
the adaptive benefits of art could be available at group level. Indeed, mathematical models 
of cultural group selection can be applied to the evolution of particular artistic traditions, 
such as the development of portable art (so-called Venus figurines) in Ice Age Europe (De 
Smedt and De Cruz, in press).   
For art to be an adaptation, it does not suffice to come up with the observation that 
art serves adaptive functions in some context. Adaptationist explanations for art need to 
specify what it is an adaptation for. Clearly, it is not difficult to come up with adaptive 
functions for art, but that is exactly the problem of such adaptationist accounts. It remains 
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as yet unclear what selective pressures may have promoted the emergence of art in the Late 
Pleistocene, therefore theorizing about it remains fairly unconstrained. The current 
selective benefits of art (for example, in terms of sexual selection) are not necessarily the 
same as those in the past.  It is interesting to note that most adaptationist approaches to art 
are concerned mainly with literature (see, e.g., the papers collected in Gottschall and 
Wilson, 2005), where the function of vicarious learning is quite plausibly explained. 
However, it remains unclear to what extent such an approach can be generalized to other 
arts, especially abstract art, music and dance. Those approaches that sketch a theory that 
encompasses most arts have the problem that the category of objects that is being explained 
is wider than what we normally regard as art. Miller (2000) explains not only art, but also 
humor and even conspicuous consumption (the wasteful advertising of one’s resources by 
spending them on luxury items or giving them away). Tooby and Cosmides (2001) 
themselves point out that their adaptive account is about fiction, the broad human ability to 
imagine counterfactual worlds and situations. Dissanayake (1995, 2000) provides not only 
an explanation for art but also for ritual and ritualized behavior, which is not even restricted 
to humans, but can be observed in many animals living in captivity and perhaps also in the 
wild (see Bekoff, 2009, for a tantalizing report about grieving magpies). To date, no 
adaptationist explanation makes a plausible case that targets artistic behavior in its entirety.  
Art as Byproduct 
Some evolutionary psychologists explain art as a byproduct of the evolved human 
mind, without the further claim that it is an adaptation. For instance, to Pinker (1997), art’s 
primary function is not to increase our biological fitness, but to “press our pleasure 
buttons” (pp. 514-525). For Pinker, art exploits aesthetic preferences that were (or are) 
adaptive in other contexts, just like cheesecake gratifies our craving for sugar and fat.  
A potentially fruitful domain of investigation for byproduct explanations of art is 
the study of cross-culturally stable properties of artistic production. The cross-cultural 
prevalence of some forms of art can be explained by their efficiency to exploit our evolved 
cognitive predispositions. Although human creativity can in principle create a wide 
diversity of artistic expressions, some of these will enjoy more success and have a higher 
chance to be incorporated in artistic traditions because of their fit with our cognitive biases. 
In the domain of music, scales provide an interesting example. Scales are collections of 
tones that divide octaves into specific intervals. Since humans can discriminate between 
about 240 pitches over an octave in the mid-range of hearing (Fastl and Zwicker, 2007), in 
principle a very large number of scales are possible. Yet, in practice, musical traditions 
only explore a modest subset of these possibilities: most scales across time and cultures are 
only between five and seven tones, often with well-defined intervals between them. Gill 
and Purves (2009) argue that this conformity can be explained by the fact that pentatonic 
and heptatonic scales (natural scales, not well-tempered scales as in modern western 
music) are close to harmonic series, which find their origin in the way humans perceive 
speech. Human vocal fold vibrations characteristic of voiced speech are mathematically 
best described by harmonic series. These function as cognitive attractors: The cross-cultural 
preference of a very limited number of scales may be explained by their fit with the 
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evolved human auditory system, which is tuned to harmonic series. Gill and Purves (2009) 
demonstrated that scales that are widely used cross-culturally, like the minor pentatonic 
scale (as in Mary had a little lamb) and the Phrygian heptatonic mode (e.g., Ralph Vaughan 
Williams’ Fantasia on a theme of Thomas Tallis), indeed correspond closely to harmonic 
series, whereas scales that are only rarely used across cultures, such as the Locrian mode 
(for instance, Metallica’s Sad but true), bear the least resemblance to them. An external 
confirmation of this hypothesis is the sound produced by a reconstruction of a 36,000-year-
old flute made of swan bone from Geißenklösterle, southwestern Germany, by the 
experimental archaeologist Friedrich Seeberger. The flute produces four tones and three 
overtones that fall neatly into a minor pentatonic scale. Seeberger (2003) can be heard 
playing the flute on a CD. The minor pentatonic scale is the most widely used musical scale 
cross-culturally, and it is also the scale that is closest to harmonic series. Next to this, most 
music, even purely instrumental music, is composed within the human vocal range, 
indicating that music may be based to some extent on auditory adaptations involved in 
human speech perception. A recent study with cotton-top tamarins (Snowdon and Teie, 
2010) provides indirect support for this hypothesis. The monkeys did not exhibit any 
noticeable behavioral reactions to human music, compared to a baseline control condition 
in which no music was played, which the experimenters interpreted as indifference. By 
contrast, the animals responded strongly to cello compositions that were modeled on 
tamarin vocalizations, showing arousal when they heard music based on aggressive 
vocalizations, and decreased activity and calm behavior when they listened to melodies 
based on affiliative calls. Human subjects found neither of the tamarin-vocalization based 
compositions pleasant. Although music is more than a rendition of vocalizations, these 
studies indicate its species-specificity.  
Conversely, some authors (e.g., Hauser and McDermott, 2003) argue that music 
depends on ancient auditory properties that predate the evolution of language. The salience 
of some tonal intervals in musical scales may be based on auditory sensitivities that humans 
share with other primates. There is some experimental support for this. Rhesus monkeys, 
manifestly a species that does not produce music, can correctly identify two versions of the 
same short tonal melody as the same, for example, when one version is played an octave 
higher. Interestingly, like with humans, their performance drops sharply when they have to 
identify atonal melodies (Wright, Rivera, Hulse, Shyan, and Neiworth, 2000). However, in 
other respects, human musical ability is more akin to that of distantly related clades, such 
as songbirds and cetaceans, than to that of our closest living relatives, the nonhuman apes. 
Whereas songbirds and cetaceans learn songs through social transmission (e.g., Foote et al., 
2006), apes, with the exception of gibbons, do not produce anything akin to song 
(Geissman, 2000) – and gibbon song does not depend on transmission through learning but 
is stereotypical and species-specific: A hybrid of two species of gibbon will combine songs 
of both parents, even if it was only exposed to the song type of one of the parents 
(Geissman, 2000, pp. 108-110). Despite many efforts, no nonhuman ape has mastered the 
ability to learn complex, novel vocalizations through social transmission (Fitch, 2005). 
Taken together, the limited evidence for musical ability and recognition in primates 
indicates that music may be specific to humans within the primates, and that it draws to an 
important extent on adaptations that are involved in the production of voiced speech, 
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including vocal fold vibrations and grammar, which evolved after hominids split from other 
ape lineages.  
In the domain of visual art, we can also expect that visual stimuli that are significant 
from an evolutionary perspective will feature prominently in art production. The canvases 
by Komar and Melamid indicate that the taste of naive art observers may be guided by 
more than cultural influences. These paintings, based on polls that probed aesthetic 
preferences in different countries, are remarkably stable across cultures: They invariably 
feature tranquil landscapes around a lake with relaxing humans in the foreground and some 
large animals in the distance (readers can visit http://www.diacenter.org/km/ for a flavor of 
this work). This is in line with studies (e.g., Orians and Heerwagen, 1992) that reveal a 
universal preference for semi-open savannah-like landscapes with trees and water, 
reminiscent of the environment in which a large part of hominid evolution took place. 
Another example is face perception. Newborns can already discriminate faces from 
other objects by detecting the shadowy patches created by eyes and mouth (Farroni et al., 
2005). Face-recognition is a highly specialized capacity in humans and other primates. Its 
neural basis is the fusiform face area, a part of the cerebral cortex that is specialized in the 
processing of face-like stimuli, and that has characteristic features, such as a diminished 
ability to recognize inverted faces (Pascalis and Bachevalier, 1998). Face recognition 
probably evolved as a means to visually recognize conspecifics, as diurnal primates have 
less developed olfactory capacities compared to other mammals, and therefore cannot 
easily recognize each other by smell. A considerable part of the world’s art production 
(e.g., portraits, busts, and masks) keys in on this evolved face-recognition system. 
Interestingly, some studies tentatively suggest that cultural face-like stimuli emphasize 
those parts of the face that humans find especially salient. Infants pay most attention to the 
eyes and mouth, and less to features like eyelashes or cheeks (Farroni et al., 2005). Still, 
face-like stimuli that are very schematic (such as smileys) elicit less neural response in the 
fusiform face area than realistic faces (Tong, Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib, and 
Kanwisher, 2000). One could predict on the basis of this that successful cultural face-like 
stimuli will have some degree of realism, but that they nevertheless emphasize the eyes and 
mouth. In support of this, Costa and Corazza (2006) found that realistic self-portraits and 
likenesses drawn from memory by art students show significant increases in the size of the 
eyes and the lips. The effect is also discernible in historical portrait art, such as in the 
striking Fayum mortuary portraits. Future research can elucidate how cognition and culture 
interact, for example, in the cultural evolution of face-like stimuli such as portraits or 
masks within particular traditions. An fMRI study of one novice and one expert portrait 
artist, who were asked to draw a series of faces (Solso, 2000), revealed an increased 
activity in the fusiform face area in both participants (albeit somewhat less in the expert) 
compared to a control condition (drawing geometric figures), indicating the importance of 
this area for the production and perception of face-like stimuli. The lower activation in the 
expert’s brain might be a consequence of more efficient processing of faces, a result of 
extensive training and practice. However, since both subjects were allowed to look at the 
faces and their own drawings during the production task, it is unclear whether this 
activation is merely due to visual perception, production or both. Miall, Gowen, and 
Tchalenko (2009) asked untrained participants to draw cartoon faces from memory, 
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preventing them from looking at their own hand or drawings during the task, thereby 
controlling for visual perception versus production of face-like stimuli. Their fMRI study 
indicated that drawing cartoon faces without direct visual perceptual input indeed also 
activates the fusiform face area.  
Equally striking is the prevalence of animal imagery in visual art across the world, 
from the early Upper Paleolithic on. Indeed, the earliest representational art depicts almost 
exclusively animals. Large dangerous carnivores and large and medium game figure 
prominently among the mammoth ivory figurines of about 36,000 years old, excavated in 
southwestern Germany (Conard, 2003) and among the slightly younger cave paintings of 
the Grotte Chauvet in southern France (Feruglio, 2006). Even in industrialized countries, 
where contact with animals is relatively sparse, depictions of animals have not diminished 
in popularity – unsystematic observations by parents and teachers indicate that the 
drawings by young western children teem with quadrupeds, birds and fish. The salience of 
such imagery may be explained by the priority our perceptual systems give to animal 
shapes. New, Cosmides, and Tooby (2007) demonstrated that subjects are substantially 
faster and more accurate at detecting changes in complex scenery when animals (even 
small ones like pigeons) were introduced or omitted compared to inanimate objects, even 
vehicles, which they have been trained for years to monitor for sudden life-or-death 
situations in traffic. As this efficiency could not be accounted for by differences in lower-
level visual characteristics or expertise, the authors assumed that people might have an 
advantage in animal categorization by virtue of the ancestral importance of this ability, 
regardless of its current utility. After all, hominids have been active hunters for at least one 
million years (Rabinovich, Gaudzinski-Windheuser, and Goren-Inbar, 2008) and had to be 
aware of predators and venomous animals for a much longer period. Neuroimaging studies 
(e.g., Caramazza and Mahon, 2003) suggest that some parts of the temporal and occipital 
cortex are exclusively dedicated to perceiving and thinking about animals. Remarkably, the 
neural correlates that correspond to the perception of animals are similar in sighted people 
as in congenitally blind subjects (Mahon, Anzelloti, Schwarzbach, Zampini, and 
Caramazza, 2009), indicating that this neural organization is not the result of perceptual 
features of animals, but rather of selective pressures that have formed specialized areas 
within the human brain that deal with semantic knowledge about animals. More systematic 
empirical research could examine to what extent art that has animal imagery or themes is 
influenced by evolved cognitive predispositions. For example, recent studies (e.g., Allen, 
Bloom, and Hodgson, 2010) indicate that young children have a preference for animal 
imagery that is canonical (e.g., elephants shown in profile, rather than in frontal view) and 
rich in relevant detail. Taken together, this leads to the following prediction: Art that 
depicts animals will tend to represent those kinds of animals that humans interacted with 
(prey animals, predators), regardless of their current effect on human fitness – it will rather 
show large carnivores than malaria-carrying mosquitoes, even though the latter have 
currently more impact on human fitness. Some artistic traditions, like Upper Paleolithic 
animal imagery in sculptures and cave paintings indeed seem to conform to this, showing 
high frequencies of predator and prey animals in prototypical postures. More systematic 
work is needed to examine to what extent this is also the case for more recent animal 
imagery in figurative art in western and nonwestern cultures.  
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If we take consilience, the convergence of two or more independent scientific 
disciplines, as a useful scientific heuristic, the byproduct account of art is preferable to the 
adaptationist view, because the former is more in line with cognitive neuroscience. The 
cognitive neuroscientific evidence reviewed here provides strong empirical support for the 
claim that various forms of art, including visual art and music, are attention-grabbing 
because of their correspondence with evolved propensities of the human neural system. The 
most likely proximate explanation for why masks, for example, elicit attention is that they 
activate the fusiform face area. The functional specialization of face-detection is such that 
perceiving faces is ineluctable: We cannot look at a depiction of a face and choose to 
regard it as a meaningless configuration of colors. A visual stimulus that has the main 
features of a face, such as a portrait or mask, thus compels the brain to pay close attention 
to it. The ultimate reason for the cultural success of masks and portraits around the world 
can be found in the evolutionary salience of face detection for humans – highly social 
animals that put a premium on individual recognition.  
It is important to note that artists need not be consciously aware of this effect. 
Artists generally do not know the effects their work has on the neural activity of their 
audience. Random variations in artistic style can be cumulatively retained to the effect that 
specific artistic traditions come to correspond more closely to evolved cognitive 
predispositions as a form of cultural selection. We already mentioned the tendency of early 
20th-century abstract art to emphasize bright color contrasts and lines, and the cross-cultural 
prevalence of musical scales that correspond to harmonic series. A short historical example 
can further clarify how this unconscious selection of artistic variations may be one of the 
driving forces in the cultural evolution of artistic traditions, next to culture-specific norms 
and preferences. Koops (1996) examined the physical appearance of children depicted in 
Dutch and Flemish paintings from the 15th to the 20th century. He drew on Lorenz’s (1943) 
theory of the “child schema” (Kindchenschema), which proposes that specific anatomical 
proportions of the face and body (in particular, a relatively large head, high forehead, large 
eyes, and short and thick limbs) elicit nurturing behavior and affective responses. In the 
Middle Ages, babies and children were depicted as miniature versions of adults. From the 
17th century onward, infants, children and even adolescents look progressively more 
neotenous (i.e., childlike).  In other words, more recent paintings turn out to correlate more 
closely with the child schema, perhaps because Dutch and Flemish painters and their 
patrons found neotenous children more attractive.  It is not that visual preferences changed; 
the preference for neoteny is probably a stable feature of adult cognition. Rather, this 
feature may have played a role as a selective pressure to retain small variations in depiction 
of children and infants. Paintings with infants and children that had slightly larger eyes and 
slightly higher foreheads were more successful than those with smaller eyes and lower 
foreheads, pushing the design of these portraits in the direction of babylike faces. The 
increasing chubbiness cannot be solely explained as a result of a better diet, since this long 
period (15th to 20th century) was punctuated by famines. It is also unlikely that the 
increased neoteny in depicted infants and children was solely driven by concerns for 
realistic depiction, as late medieval painters like Van Der Weyden or Van Der Goes could 
paint very realistic-looking adults, animals and plants, while the infants they painted looked 
like tiny adults. Moreover, exaggerated neoteny is observed in other cultural stimuli, such 
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as the increasing childlike appearance of teddy bears in the course of the 20th century which 
display increasingly higher foreheads and shorter snouts (Hinde and Barden, 1985). More 
recent examples of neoteny include toys like Littlest Pet Shop and My Little Pony, where 
there is a similar increasing size of eyes and head, accompanied with a progressive 
shortening of snouts and limbs. Interestingly, Morris, Reddy, and Bunting (1995) found 
that this cultural evolution in toys was not driven by the consumers (the children) but by 
their parents, who buy the toys and are thus the selecting agents. The ultimate explanation 
for why humans prefer cuteness in cultural stimuli is the fitness benefit it conferred to 
ancestral parents who were compelled to nurturing and caring for individuals whose 
features corresponded to the child schema. It remains a topic of future research, however, 
to identify the primary selective agent in the evolution of art: the preferences of the artists, 
or of the patrons or purchasers, or of both?  
 The evolutionary psychological byproduct account of art provides a satisfying 
explanation for the cross-cultural human drive to create and enjoy art, and for the 
recurrence of some forms of art (e.g., musical scales, faces, animals) across time and 
cultures. The evolutionary byproduct explanation and cognitive neuroscientific account 
strengthen each other. However, a few questions remain unanswered. The byproduct 
account does not explain why we do not invariably prefer art that maximally conforms to 
evolved cognitive mechanisms. Academic art5 by painters like Bouguereau or Fragonard 
generally responds to our evolved tastes in depicting attractive men and women in lush 
landscapes. Yet some influential art critics (e.g., Greenberg, 1991, p. 32) derisively refer to 
this type of art as overpolished and clichéd.  Many highly acclaimed works of visual art are 
hardly eye candy, such as Goya’s gloomy political canvases or Bacon’s haunting papal 
portraits. Unsurprisingly and in accordance with the folk concept of art, untrained art 
observers do prefer academic painters like Alma Tadema or Bouguereau (Martindale, 
1998), probably because their works are more in agreement with our evolved cognitive 
tendencies. Nevertheless, the fact that this preference for such artistic forms is not universal 
remains unexplained.  
Another future challenge for the empirical study of art consists of individual 
differences in art perception and production. What makes some people more prone to create 
art? What distinguishes art critics from the general public? Cross-culturally some people 
are more drawn to art production than others. Even relatively egalitarian societies have 
artists (i.e., individuals that are regarded as especially competent in sculpting, storytelling, 
or dancing by members of their community; Anderson, 1989). An adaptationist perspective, 
such as the one advocated by Miller (2000), can explain such individual differences as a 
result of frequency-dependent selection. Indeed, empirical tests that examine the 
relationship between artistic creativity, schizotypy and reproductive success indicate that an 
increased reproductive success associated with artistic capacity may be offset by the 
prevalence of traits indicative of schizotypy (which reduces fitness) in British poets and 
visual artists (Nettle and Clegg, 2006). This does not exclude an explanation of individual 
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differences in artistic capacities under a byproduct account. If art is a byproduct of evolved 
cognitive capacities, we may expect that a combination of individual differences in these 
capacities, and personal interest and circumstance may explain why some become artists, 
whereas others do not. Indeed, such models have been developed for other capacities that 
are seen as byproducts of evolved abilities, such as mathematical reasoning skills (e.g., 
Geary, 1995). Like art, these skills are the result of a co-optation of abilities that have an 
unrelated evolutionary function, and they are sensitive to cultural context.  
Do Reductionist Approaches Obviate the Need for Higher-level Accounts of Art?  
Cognitive neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological approaches can help us 
understand the cognitive processes that underlie art. From this examination of both 
approaches, a coherent picture emerges of art as a byproduct of normal perceptual, 
motivational and emotional brain circuits that have evolved in response to problems 
originally unrelated to art. However, from neither discipline does it become clear that art 
should be a meaningful subject of investigation within their explanatory frameworks. As 
discussed earlier, several cognitive neuroscientists (e.g., Barry, 2006; Ramachandran and 
Hirstein, 1999) argue that art draws on perceptual and motivational neural structures 
involved in everyday experience. As we have seen, evolutionary psychologists who 
propose adaptationist accounts for art (e.g., Dissanayake, 1995; Miller, 2000) typically 
target a category of behaviors that is broader than art (e.g., cultural display). Byproduct 
explanations too, do not consider art as a natural category: They make no distinction 
between an artwork and perfume, cheesecake or pornography, since all these exploit our 
evolved perceptual biases. The humanities, such as aesthetics and art theory, can 
investigate aspects of art that are not reducible to universal features of human psychology, 
but that are variable across time and cultures. Arguably, the striking dissimilarities in the 
way human figures are rendered in Utamaro’s or Hokusai’s woodcuts (Japan, Edo period) 
and Rembrandt’s etchings are better explained through art historical accounts than through 
differences in internal brain organization. The possible ways in which a human figure can 
be drawn are constrained by the human visual system. Our perceptual preference for clear-
cut shapes (Cavanagh, 2005) may account for the strong delineated shapes and the absence 
of shadow in many artistic traditions, for instance in the Japanese Edo period woodcuts that 
portray human figures. These strong lines also allow for the depiction of implied motion 
and imbalance in the human figures (e.g., sword-fighting or standing on one leg) in 
Hokusai’s Manga (1814). Indeed, a recent fMRI study indicates that motion-sensitive areas 
of the extrastriate visual cortex are recruited when participants look at these images (Osaka, 
Matsuyoshi, Ikeda, and Osaka, 2010). By contrast, Rembrandt’s use of shadows and diffuse 
shapes provides more static, almost rigid figures, but allows for a more dynamic expression 
of emotions on their faces – by making facial expressions diffuse, there is room for the 
observer’s interpretation, heightening emotional response (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, 
and Dolan, 2003). Thus, there seems to be a trade-off between clarity of shape and 
expression of emotions – both are in tune with human perceptual predispositions, but 
cannot be realized simultaneously. In order to explain the choices that have led to these 
divergent artistic styles, one needs to consider the cultural and historical context in which 
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they evolved. In the case of the Edo period woodcuts, limitations inherent to the medium of 
woodcuts and a preference for clear shapes and striking compositions in Japanese visual art 
may be contributing factors. In the case of Rembrandt’s etchings, an increased emphasis on 
expressing emotions in Baroque art may provide an explanation. In this way, empirical 
findings from cognitive neuroscience provide building blocks for testable hypotheses on 
the cultural evolution of stylistic traditions, a topic that is currently underexplored in 
evolutionary studies of art.  
The evolved preference for savannah-like landscapes might explain some recurring 
features of garden and park design, such as a relatively sparse implantation of trees and the 
frequent use of water-sources like ponds or fountains, but it does not exhaust the types of 
landscapes we find attractive. Japanese rock gardens, which consist of large stones 
surrounded by white raked sand or gravel, are a case in point. In contrast to many other 
types of gardens, Japanese rock gardens do not contain water; rather, the sand or gravel 
symbolizes seas, rivers or lakes. The aesthetic appreciation of landscapes seems to be 
subject to considerable cultural influence. For instance, the enjoyment of the sea and 
mountains is a relatively recent phenomenon in western culture – these places were thought 
of as threatening and hostile until well into the 19th century. As Corbin (1988) notes, it was 
only in the course of the late 18th century that people started to visit the beach for 
recreational purposes.   
This ineluctability of the humanities may be true for many domains of human 
culture. Consider jet-lag: Suppose scientists were able to explain all its effects through 
neural and genetic processes (i.e., they uncovered all the relevant neural structures 
responsible for generating 24-hour wake and sleep rhythms and identified the genes that 
encode circadian rhythms in humans and other animals; indeed, most of these have been 
identified; see, e.g., Antle and Silver, 2005, for an overview). Still, this would not explain 
jets or the recent phenomenon of people habitually making air voyages that span half the 
globe – for this, we need to resort to historical accounts of jet propulsion and sociological 
explanations of the rise of mass tourism and inexpensive charter flights to exotic 
destinations (which in turn is linked to the colonial history of these places). Similarly, a 
host of factors influence the appreciation and production of art, including the social status, 
education and economic background of the observer or artist, and the context in which one 
is exposed to the artwork. Consider listening to a piece of music in a concert hall to hearing 
it while waiting on the phone: The exact same piece of music can elicit feelings of emotion 
and exultation in the concert hall, while provoking boredom and irritation at the phone.  
Accepting the validity of higher-level accounts of art does not automatically lead to 
a rejection of reductionism. Weaker forms of pluralism (the position that the study of 
human behavior, including art, requires multiple autonomous perspectives) pragmatically 
imply that a given phenomenon can be studied by a variety of perspectives – there is no 
objective reason why lower-level or higher-level accounts should be the only ones worth 
pursuing. Since scholars are also interested in various properties of art that are not part of 
human biology, they can legitimately study these through the humanities. For instance, 
prevailing Buddhist and Taoist influences among Chinese scholars adequately explain the 
emergence of landscape painting in the Southern Song period and its persistence 
throughout the Ming dynasty (Cheng, 1991). We can therefore maintain that evolved neural 
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circuits in the human brain can account for the production and appreciation of art. But there 
must be more to the study of art than simply stating that it can be reduced to the physical 
structure of the brain. A promising line of research is to investigate how evolved aesthetic 
preferences causally relate to existing styles, formats and themes in artistic production 
across the world. Such an account could help us gain insight into why some art forms are 
more salient than others. For example, it seems puzzling that figurative visual art is more 
prevalent and more appealing to naive observers than abstract art, although the latter taps 
more directly into very early stages of evolved perceptual preferences. Indeed, to some 
authors (e.g., Hodgson, 2006), abstract art is most successful in tapping into primary visual 
areas, because of the prevalence of bold lines and colors. Maybe art observers not only use 
aesthetic value to gauge artworks, but also other evaluative criteria, such as the perceived 
difficulty in making the design. For abstract art, the expertise of the maker is often less easy 
to judge than it is for naturalistic representations. The search for causal mechanisms in the 
human brain may well be the most powerful strategy to account for cross-cultural universal 
patterns in artistic production and appreciation, with the potential of unifying sciences 
dedicated to the study of art.  
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